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Abstract
Diversity has been blamed for poor public goods provision in a number of
different contexts. It is associated with reduced spending on services, mea-
ger rates of tax collection, and poor policies. I argue in this paper, however,
that in semidemocratic or authoritarian countries, where political parties are
weak, diversity can be an important source of electoral competition, leading
to better services. In diverse communities where multiple identity groups are
politically mobilized, candidates are forced to seek the support of voters out-
side of their group, who are more likely to vote based on qualifications than
on group affiliation, resulting in better public officials who provide superior
services. Moreover, I find internal group fragmentation to be important in un-
derstanding the impact of heterogeneity on public goods provision: candidates
in areas where only one identity group is politically mobilized but where that
group is politically fragmented will also seek votes from other groups within the
community similar to candidates in locations with “multigroup” mobilization,
leading to improved public goods provision. These arguments are confirmed
through the analysis of tribal mobilization and public goods across Jordan’s
municipalities.
∗If published, data used for this paper will be posted on the CPS website and/or the author’s
website
1 Introduction
Diversity has been blamed for a number of social and political ills. It is said to
be responsible for poor economic policies in Africa leading to its “growth tragedy”
(Easterly and Levine, 1997). Racially and ethnically diverse communities have been
associated with reduced spending on service items and lower rates of tax collection
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999). These same communities have been found to
suffer from the poor provision of public goods whether it is fewer paved roads, lack
of school facilities, or poor maintenance of infrastructure (Bardha, 2007, Kimenyi,
2006, Miguel & Gugerty 2005).
At the same time, recent research has shown that diversity is not consistently
associated with poor service provision. An analysis of tribes in Yemen found tribal
diversity to be accompanied by higher levels of educational resources allocated by the
central government. Areas with more tribes also possessed more teachers and class-
rooms per capita (Egel, 2012). Polat (2012) noted a positive relationship between
ethnic heterogeneity and public goods provision in Jordan. A number of studies have
also highlighted a neutral or positive influence of diversity on public goods within the
United States (Boustan, Fereirra, Winkler, and Zolt, 2010, Hopkins, 2011, Putnam,
2006, Rugh & Trounstine, 2013) as well as outside of it (Gerring et al 2015, Gibson
& Hoffman, 2013, Miguel, 2004, Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenburg, 2013, Singh,
2010). Alongside these works are further studies that qualify the conditions under
which diversity impedes services. Baldwin and Huber (2010) found that only when
groups differed socioeconomically were public goods affected while Waring (2011)
and Waring and Bell (2013) note that hierarchical stratification need to be present
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for heterogeneity to have a negative impact. Gisselquist (2014) concludes that the
nature of the relationship depends on the type of public good with ethnic diversity
having no impact or a positive influence on some goods.
Like these recent studies and those included in this special issue, I argue that di-
versity does not necessarily impair public goods provision; rather, in settings where
political institutions encourage candidates to compete for the votes of those outside
of their identity group, heterogeneity is positively associated with services. Unlike
previous studies, however, I focus on a new mechanism – that of political competi-
tion. Where political parties are weak, diversity is an important source of electoral
competition, urging candidates to appeal to voters outside of their group, who are
not bound by group affiliation but support the candidates they believe will provide
the best services. I also argue that in homogeneous settings where only one group is
mobilized that if the dominant group is electorally fragmented then candidates will
similarly be forced to seek the support of those outside of their identity group to
win elections. In other words, I find good public goods provision in locations with
“multigroup” mobilization because of high levels of cross-group voting but that in
communities with “monogroup” mobilization, the quality of services to be dependent
upon the level of political fragmentation. Locations with monogroup mobilization
but where the mobilized group is politically fragmented provide good services while
locations with monogroup mobilization where the group is cohesive do not.
This paper makes several contributions to the study of heterogeneity and public
goods provision. Empirically, I use an original dataset that measures diversity by
counting the number of tribes offering candidates in recent municipal elections in
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Jordan. Unlike many studies of diversity and public goods provision, I enumerate
the number of groups that matter politically rather than utilizing a demographic
measure that captures absolute levels of diversity without distinguishing between
groups that are or are not politically active. Theoretically, I demonstrate that multi-
group mobilization can actually have a positive impact on public goods provision
and offer a new mechanism based on political competition for understanding this
phenomenon. Finally, this study emphasizes that when considering the relationship
between group mobilization and public goods provision, internal “heterogeneity” can
be as important as external heterogeneity.
2 Identity Group Mobilization, Fragmentation, and
Public Goods Provision
In one of the first pieces to highlight the negative impacts of diversity, Easterly and
Levine (1997) find that ethnic heterogeneity hinders growth via poor economic poli-
cies. They explain that ethnic groups have differing preferences, making it difficult
to compromise and coordinate government policy. As a result, officials pursue poli-
cies that benefit their own group but not the collective. A number of other studies
have confirmed this negative relationship. Heterogeneous communities have been
associated with lower expenditures on education, roads, sewers, and trash collec-
tion (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999), decreased access to public goods (Banerjee,
Iyer, & Somanathan 2005, Banerjee & Somanathan, 2007), and less cooperation in
the production of these goods (Bardhan, 2000, Vigdor, 2004). Diverse communities
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also fare worse in raising school funds and maintaining school facilities (Miguel &
Gugerty, 2005, Addison & Rahman, 1999).
Despite what might seem to be emerging consensus, there are reasons why we
should be wary about whether heterogeneity is associated with poor services. While
many different types of diversity (i.e. religious, linguistic, cultural) have been stud-
ied, the bulk of the literature focuses on ethnic diversity, with most scholars (i.e.
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Miguel & Gugerty,
2005) using demography to measure diversity and to calculate the ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (ELF) index. One weakness of this index, however, is that it does
not differentiate between reinforcing and cross-cutting cleavages (Dunning & Har-
rison, 2010, Gubler & Selway, 2012, Selway, 2011a, Selway, 2011b, Selway 2015,
Stewart, 2002). ELF by itself is an insufficient measure because it does not take into
account differences between groups such as the distribution of income (Baldwin &
Huber, 2010, Lupu & Pontusson, 2011, Ostby, 2008), their geographic distribution
(Matuszeski & Schneide,r 2006) or the distribution of power across groups (Ceder-
man & Girardin, 2007). Nor does it account for the size of ethnic groups relative to
one another as captured by a polarization index (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2004).
Finally, as Birnir (2007) and Selway (2015) demonstrate, ELF ignores political in-
stitutions which influence whether ethnic groups have a stabilizing or destabilizing
effect on democratic politics and whether multiethnic societies underprovide public
goods.
A second weakness of the ELF index is the use of demography as the founda-
tion for capturing diversity. Demography by itself is a poor measure as it fails to
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distinguish between ethnic structure, defined as the “distribution of descent based
attributes that all individuals possess” with ethnic practice or the “act of using
one or more identities embedded in this structure to guide behavior” (Chandra &
Wilkinson, 2008, 523; Lieberman & Singh, 2012). A listing of ethnic groups and their
memberships by itself does not tell us which ethnic identities are politically activate
and ignores the possibility that other cleavages – like language, religion, or class –
might be more salient (Posner, 2005).
In the tradition of these critiques, I argue in this paper that it is not diversity per
se that matters but whether political institutions encourage groups to compete for
the votes of members outside of their specific identity group. This argument is similar
to that proposed by Selway (2015) and Gibson and Hoffman (2013) in explaining the
positive relationship between diversity and public goods provision, but while they
focus on the formation of broad-based coalitions across ethnicities, the mechanism
outlined here is political competition. In the theory described here, I posit that
political competition improves public goods provision in communities and describe
two sources of competition: the first is the result of the mobilization of multiple
identity groups (“multigroup” mobilization), while the second occurs in communi-
ties where only one group is mobilized (“monogroup” mobilization) but where that
group is fragmented into branches, clans, or other subgroups. The argument and its
mechanisms are outlined in the arrow diagram and explained in detail below. In this
paper I explore only the relationship between group mobilization, fragmentation, and
service provision.
Multigroup Mobilization or Fragmentation of One Group → Heightened
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Political Competition→ Better Elected Officials→ Improved Service Pro-
vision
In countries where identity politics are relevant, identity groups, regardless of
the type of cleavage (i.e. ethnic, religious, linguistic), field candidates or use parties
as a cover for their own political activities. Chandra (2004, 2007) notes that in
India limited information and the importance of patronage encourage ethnic voting.
In a number of Arab countries, such as Jordan, Kuwait, and Yemen, tribes play an
active part in nominating candidates (Layne, 1994, Langston, 2005, Tetreault, 2000).
Similarly, in Zambia, the main political cleavage is linguistic (Gibson & Hoffman,
2013).
When only one group (i.e. one tribe or one ethnic group) is present in a commu-
nity, group leader(s) can control the number of candidates in elections. However, this
is difficult when several groups (i.e. several tribes or several ethnic groups) partici-
pate in politics. In communities where multiple groups are mobilized, it is unlikely
that one group will obey the directives of another unless they are all members of the
same electoral alliance. Consequently, more candidates are likely to run in communi-
ties with multigroup mobilization, forcing candidates to appeal to a broader audience
to win elections. In locations where multiple groups are mobilized, no single group
is likely to have enough members to win elections outright.
Indeed previous studies have emphasized how social heterogeneity heightens polit-
ical competition. Arguing that social cleavages are often the basis of political prefer-
ences, Powell (1982) found that social heterogeneity increases the effective number of
parties. In a study of Louisiana state elections, Jones (1997) noted a positive associa-
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tion between racial heterogeneity and the effective number of candidates. Ordeshook
and Shvetsova (1994), Neto and Cox (1997), and Taagepera (1999), however, assert
that heterogeneity does not have an additive effect but rather its influence depends
on district magnitude1. When district magnitude is one, heterogeneity has virtually
no impact on the effective number of parties, but at high levels of district magnitude,
diversity and the number of parties are positively correlated. Stoll (2013) confirms
these findings by examining a variety of sources of heterogeneity such as sex, foreign
birth, geographic location, and socioeconomic background on party formation. Al-
though different sources of heterogeneity have varying effects on the effective number
of parties, the relationship is always positive.
When there is a candidate from one’s own identity group, members are also likely
to support that individual but for reasons other than her ability to provide public
goods. First, the candidate’s ability to provide patronage is often paramount in
authoritarian elections, with group members eager to secure a seat for their candidate
so that they are accorded priority (Auyero, 2000, Blaydes, 2011, Chandra, 2007,
Shehata, 2008, Valeri, 2009). Secondly, each identity group can easily mobilize its
members because of existing networks (Besley, Coate, & Lowry, 1993, Scarritt &
Mozzafar, 1999). Habyarimana et al. (2007) in a series of experiments in Uganda
found that members of the same ethnic group located co-ethnics with greater ease
than those outside of the group. Thirdly, findability is important because if members
do not support a candidate, then they can be sanctioned. Even with secret ballots,
it is possible for candidates to determine how members voted by employing a variety
1District magnitude is the number of representatives elected from a particular electoral district
to the same legislative body.
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of techniques (Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004, Stokes, 2005).
These reasons suggest, therefore, that candidates who receive most of their sup-
port from their own group members are likely to be inferior in terms of providing pub-
lic goods compared with those who garner votes from many groups. Members may
be pressured to support the candidate from their own group, regardless of her quali-
fications. Non-group members, however, are at greater liberty to support whomever
they choose. Political competition, therefore, produces better public goods because
it leads to the election of more competent public officials2.
Previous scholars have also highlighted the ability of electoral competition to
improve public goods. In a study of antipoverty programs in Mexico, Hiskey (2003)
found that multiparty electoral competition was associated with better provision of
water, sewage, and electricity. Furthermore, the programs themselves had a larger
and positive impact on these services in locations with competition compared to
locations where the dominant party, PRI, was certain to win. Similarly, Hecock
(2006) noted heightened electoral competition led to greater education spending in
Mexican states. Other studies have found competition influences the characteristics
of officials or their behavior. In China, villages holding elections were more likely
to result in the selection of officials who shared similar views to those of residents
(Manion, 1996). The more free and fair elections, the more likely village officials
were also to advocate on behalf of their residents (Birney, 2007).
The argument thus far assumes that political competition is low in locations
2I expect low and moderate levels of electoral competition to have a positive influence on the
provision of public goods. However, at extremely high levels of electoral competition when the num-
ber of candidates greatly proliferate, public goods provision may actually suffer because candidates
need fewer votes to win and therefore, can cater to their specific identity groups.
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where only one group chooses to participate in politics. But there are also circum-
stances when high levels of political competition are present in these communities.
Locations where only one group is mobilized also have competitive elections if the
group in question is politically fragmented. Fragmentation can be defined as the in-
ability of a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit of instrumental
objectives and/or for the satisfaction of members’ affective needs (Carron, Brawley,
& Widmeyer, 1998, 213). A fragmented group is one where members do not support
one another or work together even though doing so would help them achieve an out-
come beneficial to the entire group. Despite attempts to impose a decision upon the
group, implementation is impossible because of the lack of commitment of members
to act in unison (Beal, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003).
There are various ways that fragmentation manifests itself in society but this
paper focuses on fragmentation during elections. During these periods, the group
leadership might decide to nominate a certain number of candidates but if fragmen-
tation is high then various subdivisions of the main group will also contest elections
and ignore the orders of the leadership at-large (Glennerster, Miguel, & Rothenberg
2013, Kotler-Berkowitz, 2001). Under these circumstances, candidates, even though
they are members of the mobilized group, will need votes from members of unmo-
bilized groups in the community and/or from members of other subdivisions within
their own group. Multiple candidates representing the same group may also pro-
vide greater freedom to its members, who become more at liberty to vote for their
preferred candidate.
We would, therefore, expect locations with monogroup mobilization but high
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levels of group fragmentation like locations with multigroup mobilization to provide
good services as well. Due to high levels of political competition, locations with
multigroup mobilization should be associated with good service provision regardless
of whether fragmentation is high or low. On the contrary, locations with monogroup
mobilization but with low levels of fragmentation should experience poor service
provision. Figure 1 below summarizes these expectations where “poor” or “good”
refers to the quality of services.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
We expect good service provision in areas of high mobilization and high frag-
mentation because many groups will contest elections and each group is likely to
splinter into several electoral factions. In such a scenario, the incentive to seek votes
from non-members is high, leading to better services. This same phenomenon is also
likely in areas of high mobilization but low fragmentation because many groups will
be competing against one another, even though they are electorally cohesive. We
expect, therefore, good public goods provision in these locations too. Similarly, the
desire to seek the votes of non-members and hence, good services will be present in
areas with low mobilization and high fragmentation. While few or perhaps only one
identity group will be mobilized, this group will subdivide into several subgroups that
compete against one another during elections, providing the incentive once again to
seek the votes of non-members, which in turn improves services. However, service
provision should be poor in locations with low levels of fragmentation and mobiliza-
tion because not only will there be few identity groups competing against one another
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but those groups that do compete will remain electorally cohesive, dampening the
desire to seek cross-group voters and resulting in poor public goods provision.
These expectations lead to two situations where the interactive effect of identity
group mobilization and fragmentation is predicted to improve public goods provision:
H1: When political fragmentation is low, increasing the number of polit-
ically mobilized groups exerts a positive impact on service provision. At
high levels of fragmentation, increasing the number of mobilized groups
does not impact the quality of services.
H2: When the number of mobilized groups is low, increasing levels of
political fragmentation also improves service provision. But when the
number of mobilized groups is high, increasing the fragmentation of in-
dividual groups has no effect.
3 Tribes in Jordan
To evaluate the hypotheses, I use data collected from Jordanian municipalities. Po-
litical competition amongst Jordanians occurs between tribes, which are “group[s]
of people distinguished from other groups by notions of shared descent, whether real
or imagined” (Alon, 2009, 8). Members of these tribes can be ethnic Jordanians (35
percent of the population), ethnic Palestinians (60 percent), or Jordanians of Arme-
nian, Chechen, or Circassian descent (5 percent; Minority Rights International, n.d.).
In the political arena, however, competition is between tribal groups rather than eth-
nic groups. In other words, ethnic Palestinian tribes and ethnic Jordanian tribes do
11
not ally together as two ethnic blocs. Palestinian tribes also compete against other
Palestinian tribes.
Jordan is a good case of the “accommodationist” model of nation-building de-
scribed in AUTHORS’ introduction to this special issue. When the British relin-
quished power to the Hashemite monarchy in 1946, King Abdullah needed to gain
the allegiance of Jordanian tribes (Alon, 2009, Robins, 2004). Like other examples
described by AUTHORS, the Jordanian monarchy’s provision of public goods was
used to encourage political loyalty and to ensure the survival of the newly established
royal family. Abdullah and later heirs gradually centralized and assumed most of
the services once administered by tribes but because they continue to honor tribal
identity and permit some level of local autonomy, public goods provision varies at the
subnational level. Today Jordan is an example of a weak accommodationist state.
Almost all services (i.e. health, education, security) are provided by the central gov-
ernment but some autonomy is still available to tribes, who might prefer to negotiate
their own settlements during inter-tribal conflicts or offer charitable services through
their own civic organizations.
The case of Jordan also exemplifies the central claim of this special issue: that
both contemporary diversity and contemporary public goods provision are shaped
by historical nation-building strategies. Because of the accommodationist strategy
adopted by early Hashemite monarchs, individual tribal identities continue to be
salient in Jordan. Likewise, the decision to centralize most services while permitting
some degree of tribal autonomy was the result of historical policy to create a sense
of national identity while at the same time preserving strong tribal allegiances. Fur-
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thermore, like other papers in this special issue, this paper embodies the revisionist
agenda outlined by AUTHORS’ introduction by challenging the supposed consensus
around the negative relationship between diversity and public goods provision.
Jordan is also an excellent setting for this research because politics at the subna-
tional level is almost exclusively tribal. As there are few parties that offer candidates
in local elections, this permits us to focus exclusively on the role of group loyalties,
without having to deal with confounding factors such as party membership3. This
is also why a subnational focus is appropriate here – parties do play a greater role
in Jordanian national politics. Furthermore, a subnational focus permits us to con-
centrate on the level of governance where political competition for leadership, the
proposed mechanism for understanding public goods provision in this paper, actually
matters. Many public goods at the national level are under the authority of the King
and his ministers, none of whom are elected. In addition, tribal members are more
closely monitored and sanctioned in local settings, where the proximity of relations
is closer and the population of voters smaller.
The use of the single nontransferable vote system (SNTV) combined with multi-
member electoral districts in Jordan also introduces variation in fragmentation amongst
tribes. At the municipal level, mayors are elected via the majoritarian system but
council members are elected via SNTV where the top n vote-getters fill the seats in
the council. 16 percent of Jordanian municipalities are comprised of one electoral
district while 84 are divided into multiple districts, with varying numbers of council
3Political parties are not strong at the local level; and the Islamic Action Front, the most popular
political party, boycotted the 2007 municipal elections (JCSR, 2007). The data used in this paper
is derived from these elections.
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seats per district. The use of SNTV in Jordan, where 90 percent of the municipalities
are comprised of at least one multi-member electoral district, therefore, introduces
variation in tribal fragmentation, a phenomenon that would not be observed in single-
member districts where it makes sense for tribes to nominate only one candidate.
Large tribes like large parties are prone to over-nomination and tribal fragmentation
under SNTV. While a small party rarely over-nominates, “a large party with two
incumbents in a district in which it had a chance at three might find it difficult to
convince its incumbents to take the risk of diluting the party vote too far” (Cox,
1996, 741-742). SNTV also encourages candidates to cultivate a personal vote in or-
der to distinguish themselves from competitors even within their same party (Carey
& Shugart, 1995). Finally, it should be noted Jordan also has a womens quota where
20 percent of all council seats are allocated to females. These seats are awarded to
the n women who win the greatest percentage of votes in their electoral district but
do not win competitively, where n is the number of quota seats.
Finally, unlike other studies where measures of mobilization are based on ap-
proximate measures, the unique data used in this paper permit exact identification
of which groups have mobilized and the degree to which electoral fragmentation has
occurred. As described below, candidate lists from the 2007 municipal elections were
utilized to identify mobilized groups and the number of candidates they offered to
gauge their level of fragmentation.
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4 Data and Methods
To evaluate the relationship between tribal mobilization, fragmentation, and service
provision, I use data collected across 93 municipalities in Jordan. At the time of data
collection, there were 93 municipalities but now the number has expanded to 100. I
use an original dataset that combines measures of public goods provision with a new
operationalization of diversity: the number of tribes offering candidates in the 2007
municipal elections. To create this dataset, over 2300 candidates were categorized
by tribe through discussion with locals and consultation of reference books.
In Jordan, the municipality is responsible for a total of 26 tasks, many of which
affect the daily lives of its residents. These responsibilities include issuing business
licenses, approval of planning applications, street paving and maintenance, street-
lighting, street cleaning, garbage collection, health and sanitary inspections, moni-
toring zoning violations, landscaping of public areas, and public building projects.
The central government also works collaboratively with municipalities on a number
of responsibilities such as disaster relief, fire prevention and safety, and the creation
and maintenance of sewage systems. As noted earlier, the electoral system used for
municipal council elections is SNTV.
Because I argue that the positive impact of tribal mobilization on public goods
provision is dependent upon tribal fragmentation (hypothesis 1) and that the posi-
tive impact of tribal fragmentation on public goods provision is also dependent upon
the level of tribal mobilization (hypothesis 2), I use an interactive model to evalu-
ate my expectations where the main independent variables are tribal mobilization,
fragmentation, and their interaction: tribal mobilization x fragmentation. I outline
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below the measurement of these variables as well as measures of the dependent and
control variables.
4.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, service provision, is measured by two outcomes: (1) the log
of the percentage of municipal revenues that are self-collected (revenues) and (2) a
count of the quantity of heavy equipment owned by the municipality such as bulldoz-
ers, steamrollers, and air compressors used to carry out construction or maintenance
tasks (equipment). Data for revenues and equipment are for the 2009-2010 fiscal year
and were collected from the Cities and Villages Development Bank and the Ministry
of Municipal Affairs in Jordan, respectively. Descriptive statistics for this and other
variables are available in Table 1. Both tasks are solely under the jurisdiction of
municipalities and are neither the responsibility of the central government nor other
local authorities. Moreover, each measure captures an important aspect of service
provision.
Municipalities receive a grant from the central government but they are also
responsible for collecting their own taxes. However, many fail to collect all of the
fees and taxes owed. Across 93 municipalities, the lowest percentage of revenues that
are self-collected by the municipality is 3 percent while the highest is 81 percent. The
average municipality collects 30 percent of its own revenue and over three-quarters
of municipality were in debt in 2009. As Clark (2012) notes, favoritism to family
members and friends and the interference of members of parliament, who lobby on
behalf of some residents, impedes this collection process.
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Could it be that residents are taxed heavily in municipalities with multitribal
mobilization, which is why more revenues are collected? Under this scenario the mu-
nicipality would have an improved financial situation but this would not be better
for residents. In municipalities with multitribal mobilization, it is not that residents
find it difficult to evade taxes but that they are less likely to have personal links
with municipal officials or staff. In locations with monotribal mobilization, many
residents are likely to be members of the mobilized tribe – if several tribes had large
memberships within the municipality then multiple tribes rather than a single one
would have politically mobilized. Therefore, many residents in monotribal commu-
nities have links with someone within the municipality; and while municipal officials
may feel social obligations to waive or postpone the fees of members of their tribe,
they are better able to avoid this temptation when there is no familial tie.
Self-collected revenues are indicative of good public goods provision for several
reasons. First of all, because of recent strict control by the Ministry of Municipal Af-
fairs over hiring decisions, it is unlikely for revenues to be spent on non-service items
such as employing additional superfluous staff. Secondly, a high percentage of rev-
enues that are self-collected indicates low levels of patronage within the municipality
and potentially, greater spending on services. If patronage levels were high, self-
collected revenues are likely to be low because residents are able to avoid payment.
Finally, a number of other studies examining the relationship between diversity and
public goods provision have also used the generation of tax revenues as an indicator
of service provision. Baldwin and Huber (2010) examine tax revenues as a percent-
age of GDP; Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), the amount of local government
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taxes collected per capita; Miguel and Gugerty (2003), the total amount of locally
collected school funding per pupil; and La Porta et al (1999), a measure of local tax
compliance. Therefore, demonstrating that multitribal mobilization improves or at
least does not dampen tax collection would be a valuable theoretical contribution.
The availability of heavy equipment is also critical for a multitude of essential
municipal functions such as fixing streetlights, maintaining and paving roads, and
collecting trash. Because of the high costs of new equipment, some municipalities lack
sufficient machines and have to rent equipment or contract out services4. One donor
program working at the local level found that all municipalities required assistance
with purchasing equipment. Renting equipment is not ideal as municipalities are
unable to respond as quickly to the query (i.e. fixing a streetlight) and are at the
whim of the timetable of other municipalities. Awarding contracts for services can
also adversely affect the quality of services – contractors for trash collection perform
poorly compared with municipal trash collectors because they do not know the roads
as well and are less adept at dealing with local merchants5.
4.2 Independent Variables
The independent variable, tribal mobilization (tribal mobilization), is measured by
counting the number of tribes that offered candidates for the municipal council in
the 2007 municipal elections. Unlike many studies, which account for absolute di-
versity, this measure takes into account only those groups that actually participate
in politics. As Daniel Posner (2004) points out, ”[t]o capture the contribution that a
4Personal correspondence with former municipal employee, June 2014
5Interviews with Ministry of Municipal Affairs employee, September and October 2014
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country’s ethnic heterogeneity makes to its policymaking process requires an index of
fractionalization that reflects the groups that are actually doing the competing over
policy” (2004, 853, emphasis original). If we posit that ethnic diversity exerts influ-
ence through its impact on government policies then we must identify “the roster of
actual participants in the competition over those policies” (853).
While similar to Posner’s measure, my indicator of tribal mobilization is better
situated for this study for several reasons. Because Posner uses a number of resources
across time to identify relevant groups, it becomes difficult to pinpoint which groups
are relevant at any point in time. Secondly, the authors of those resources used by
Posner did not always agree which groups were political players. Thirdly, Posner’s
criteria for politically relevant groups may be different from those of his sources
leading to the inclusion of some inappropriate groups and the exclusion of some
appropriate ones. However, my indicator of tribal mobilization uses the same criteria
(i.e. participation in the 2007 municipal elections) and avoids the ambiguity present
in Posner’s study.
To determine which tribe each candidate belonged to, I identified her family
name and then located the corresponding entry in dictionaries of Jordanian and
Palestinian tribes. A number of dictionaries are available but because scholars can
disagree about tribal structures and whether a tribe is truly a tribe or should be
considered the branch of another tribe, I consistently used certain sources, the list of
which is available upon request. For candidates for whom there was no relevant entry
in the dictionaries, I asked locals knowledgeable about tribes (i.e., council members
who ran alongside them in elections or residents who live in the municipality), called
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the municipality office to speak to a relevant employee, or asked the candidates
themselves.
It should be noted that tribes are constantly evolving with new tribes being
formed as well as established tribes merging together. While this means that family
surnames are not stable across time, anecdotal evidence suggests that the process of
change is a slow one. For instance, the reference books used to classify tribes span
40 years but the majority of tribes mentioned in these texts are the same.
4.3 Tribal Fragmentation
Ideally for a measure of tribal fragmentation, I would want to compare how many
candidates were endorsed by each tribe with how many candidates actually ran from
each tribe. As noted earlier the electoral system used in Jordan is SNTV and the
vast majority of Jordanian municipalities have at least one multi-member electoral
district. For tribes with low levels of fragmentation, the number of candidates run-
ning should be equivalent to the number of candidates endorsed by the tribe. But for
tribes with high levels of fragmentation, we would expect the number of candidates
to exceed the number who were endorsed.
Unfortunately, I do not know of the 2300 candidates in the 2007 municipal elec-
tions, how many were actually endorsed across Jordan’s 93 municipalities. Therefore,
I make a logical guess as to how many candidates the tribe “ought” to have run by
examining the number of seats the tribe could have won. If a tribe could have won
2 seats then I infer that tribe ought to have run only 2 candidates. If that tribe
did indeed offer 2 candidates then its tribal fragmentation is low but if it offered 4
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candidates its level of tribal fragmentation is higher.
To ascertain the number of seats the tribe could have won, I examine the vote
share garnered by candidates from that tribe as compared to the total number of
votes in the electoral district. Using this vote share, I calculate how many seats on
the council that tribe could logically have expected to win. The measure of tribal
fragmentation (fragmentation) is therefore, the ratio of the number of candidates the
tribe actually ran to the number of candidates that it should have run. High values
of tribal fragmentation mean that the tribe is electorally fragmented (the number
of candidates representing the tribe and the number of seats that the tribe could
have won differ dramatically) while low values indicate that the tribe is cohesive.
Using the example above, the tribe that should have offered 2 candidates and did
indeed do so has a fragmentation value of 1 while the tribe that should have offered
2 candidates but offered 4 has a fragmentation value of 2.
But how can we expect each tribe to know how many candidates it ought to run?
Through repeated elections since 1955, tribes have gained a fairly good understanding
of their own electoral position (National Democratic Institute 1995). Small tribes
know that they need to either coalesce together or to ally with a larger tribe in order
to be successful. Larger tribes know that they have good chances of winning and
almost always enter the race. Many tribes are aware of how many votes its members
offer and the percentage of these votes their candidates are likely to garner. It is
more difficult for the tribe to predict how many votes they will gain from members
of other tribes but the candidate’s involvement in civic affairs and general status in
the municipality give some indication. In the municipality of Hassa, for instance,
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even though the Hajaya tribe dominates the population demographically, the tribe
coordinated both the number of candidates for mayoral and council positions6. In
the municipality of Madaba, on the other hand, the Shawabkeh tribe endorsed only
one tribal candidate but several others entered the race nonetheless7.
4.4 Control Variables
For each regression estimation, the following variables serve as controls.
Demographic controls Municipalities with large populations (population) or
large areas (area) should be associated with possessing a greater quantity of equip-
ment as more garbage compressors, bulldozers, and so on would be needed to serve
such locations. A high population or a large area should also be associated with
a greater percentage of revenues that are self-collected because in these municipali-
ties there is less likelihood of residents knowing an employee within the municipality
and therefore, using personal connections to receive a discount or postponement of
their payment. Population is measured by the number of residents living in the
municipality in 2004; area, in the unit of dunums (1 dunum = 1000m2) in 2005.
Socioeconomic controls A higher rate of poverty (poverty rate) amongst res-
idents should be associated with a decrease in the quantity of equipment and the
percentage of self-collected revenues. Poorer municipalities should be less able to
afford equipment and residents less willing to pay fees and taxes. An indicator of
financial assistance from the central government (government grant) is included as
municipalities with more assistance from the Center can also spend more on public
6Interview with Hassa local official, April 2010
7Interview with Madaba local official, March 2010
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goods. The specific measure used is the log of the amount transferred by the central
government to each municipality in 2008.
District controls District magnitude (district magnitude) is likely to be posi-
tively associated with the tribal mobilization as more tribes are likely to offer can-
didates when there is a greater number of council seats available. The number of
electoral districts within the municipality (electoral district) may also positively in-
fluence the number of politically active tribes. The political salience of a tribe will
also be dependent upon whether its members are divided across several districts or
live primarily in one district.
Significant presence of Jordanians of Palestinian descent Any tribe that
offered a candidate in the 2007 municipal elections is included in the tribal mobiliza-
tion and fragmentation measures, which means that all tribes of Palestinian descent
that offered candidates are also included. Although ethnic Palestinians are included
in both measures, their presence is likely to also exert an independent effect as mu-
nicipalities with a significant presence of ethnic Palestinians may be associated with
a higher percentage of revenues. Because of their high rate of participation in the
Jordanian private sector, it is said that on average they are wealthier than ethnic
Jordanians. In order to determine whether a municipality possesses a “significant”
population of ethnic Palestinians, candidate lists were reviewed to identify candi-
dates of Palestinian descent. Municipalities where candidates of Palestinian origin
received at least 10 percent of the vote were initially coded as having a “significant”
population (Palestinian population). Because members are likely to vote for their
own tribe, the number of votes received by the candidate can be used as a rough
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measure of the size of her tribe. I use a fairly low threshold (10 percent) to denote
the presence of ethnic Palestinians because Palestinians are less politically active and
the percentage of votes received by Palestinian candidates is likely to under represent
their actual numbers. This initial coding was then reviewed by locals knowledgeable
on this subject and revised as necessary.
Category of the municipality The Ministry of Municipal Affairs categorizes
municipalities according to their population and political importance (i.e. whether
they are the capital of a governorate, district, or subdistrict). Currently there are
4 categories of municipality with category 1 municipalities having the highest pop-
ulations and/or being the capital of a governorate. Municipalities in categories 1
and 2 are likely to have a higher percentage of revenues that are self-collected and
quantity of equipment because they have greater populations which are also likely
to be wealthier. The category of the municipality is included as a series of binary
variables (category 1, category 2, category 3, category 4) with the category 4 variable
left out of the regression as the base category.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
4.5 Regression Estimation
Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) was used to carry out analysis. SUR allows
for the simultaneous estimation of a series of regressions (2 regressions here, one
for each of the service provision outcomes) rather than estimating each regression
separately and permits standard errors in the different equations to be correlated
(Tsai, 2007). Because municipalities only have limited resources, the widespread
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collection of fees and taxes may not be accompanied also by a large quantity of
equipment. A municipality that places a great deal of resources in training staff to
collect fees may not be able to spend additional resources to acquire equipment and
vice versa. The advantage to SUR is that it permits joint hypothesis tests using
information across both regressions (Miguel, 2004).
There are 93 municipalities in Jordan but coefficient estimates are based on data
for 90 of the observations. The three most populous municipalities have extraor-
dinarily high levels of tribal mobilization and heavily influence results if included.
Table 2 lists the mean values for tribal mobilization (independent variable) and the
two measures of service provision (dependent variables) for the first 90 observations
and also for the three outliers. As can be seen, the mean values for the three out-
liers differ quite remarkably from the remaining 90 municipalities. However, deleting
these three outliers means throwing away information and leads to biased estimates
of the error variance and all of its derivatives. In order to keep these outliers in
the regression but to prevent them from exerting influence on coefficient estimates,
I create three binary variables (outlier 1, outlier 2, outlier 3) for each of these three
observations.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
5 Regression Results
The first step is to examine hypothesis 1 and whether tribal mobilization has a
positive impact on public goods provision at low levels of tribal fragmentation. To
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do so, I estimate two regressions, one for equipment and one for revenues that includes
tribal mobilization, fragmentation, their interaction, and all of the control variables
(model 1). The results are displayed in Table 3. From this table we can see that tribal
mobilization, fragmentation, and the interaction term are statistically significant.
However, despite a significant relationship, we cannot directly use the substantive
value or the signs of the coefficients on tribal mobilization, fragmentation, and their
interaction term to understand their collective impact on public goods provision. To
understand the relationship between these three factors, we must use Figures 2 and
3 to examine the marginal impact of tribal mobilization on public goods provision.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The solid lines in the middle of these two figures display the marginal impact
of tribal mobilization on self-collected revenues and equipment at various levels of
fragmentation (y-axis). These solid lines showcase how the impact of tribal mobi-
lization on equipment and revenues changes as tribal fragmentation changes. The
impact of tribal mobilization on revenues and equipment is only statistically signif-
icant when the two dotted lines, which are the upper and lower bounds of the 95
percent confidence interval, are both either above 0 or below 0. When the upper and
lower bounds are above 0 then tribal mobilization has a positive impact on public
goods provision and where the bounds are below 0, a negative impact.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
From Figures 2 and 3, we can see that where tribal fragmentation is low, tribal
mobilization is associated with a greater quantity of heavy equipment and greater
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percentage of revenues that are self-collected. The effect of tribal mobilization is
significant, however, only at low levels of fragmentation: when it is 1.1 or less for
self-collected revenues and 1.5 or less for the quantity of equipment. In other words,
tribal mobilization only has a positive impact on public goods provision when tribes
nominate on average 1 or 1.5 candidates for every candidate they ought to nominate.
At high levels of fragmentation, when the tribe nominates several candidates beyond
what they should, tribal mobilization no longer has a statistically significant impact
on services. Furthermore, the substantive impact of tribal mobilization on revenues
and equipment decreases as fragmentation increases. These results are in accordance
with the first hypothesis, where I had predicted that tribal mobilization would have
a positive impact on public goods provision but only under circumstances where
electoral competition is low (i.e. when fragmentation levels are low).
The second step is to examine hypothesis 2 and whether tribal fragmentation has a
positive influence on public goods provision at low levels of tribal mobilization. While
the regression used to examine hypothesis 2 is the same as that used for hypothesis
1 (model 1), we need to examine this time, the marginal impact of fragmentation
on public goods provision, which is displayed in Figures 4 and 5. Once again the
solid lines here display this marginal impact – this time of fragmentation on public
goods provision at varying levels of tribal mobilization – while the dotted lines are
the upper and lower bounds of the 90 percent confidence interval. These figures
show that fragmentation has a positive influence on both the quantity of heavy
equipment and the percentage of revenues that are self-collected when levels of tribal
mobilization are low: 4 or less for equipment and 3 or less than for self-collected
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revenues. This means that when the number of tribes mobilized is less than 3 or 4,
increasing fragmentation results in greater quantity of equipment and the collection
of revenues. This is in accordance with the predictions of the second hypothesis
where I had anticipated fragmentation to positively influence public goods provision
only when other sources of electoral competition (i.e. tribal mobilization) were low.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]
Figures 4 and 5 also show that at high levels of tribal mobilization when the
number of tribes mobilized is 14 or greater increasing fragmentation does not impact
the quantity of heavy equipment, which is as predicted, but has a negative effect on
the percentage of revenues that are self-collected, which is not in accordance with
hypothesis 2. This is a puzzling result as according to this hypothesis, at high levels
of mobilization, increasing fragmentation should have no impact on public goods
provision. What explains then these contradictory results?
One explanation for this finding is that municipalities with high levels of tribal
mobilization and high levels of fragmentation are likely to be large sprawling ur-
ban metropolises where the city center has high levels of tribal mobilization but
surrounding metropolitan areas are homogeneous with low levels of mobilization.
Because council members in the metropolitan areas are likely to have won due to
votes mainly from their own tribes, patronage levels are also likely to be high and
collecting fees from residents difficult. Residents in metropolitan areas may also re-
sent paying fees because they feel that bulk of the municipal budget is reserved for
services in the city center than distributed to the areas where they live. After munic-
ipalities were conglomerated in 2001 residents of smaller municipalities that became
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attached to larger ones complained that their areas were neglected8. But why does
this geographical arrangement affect revenues but not the quantity of equipment?
This may be because while dissatisfied residents can withhold financial contributions,
they cannot control the number of equipment that the municipality acquires as this
is a decision made by the municipal leadership and not by themselves.
5.1 Robustness Check
In a semi-democratic country like Jordan, the central government and the ability
of those in power to play favorites amongst the municipalities – rather than tribal
mobilization and fragmentation may explain most of the variation in service provi-
sion. Perhaps some municipalities do better only because the Center has been more
generous in providing assistance to those locations and not because municipalities
with multitribal mobilization give candidates incentives to seek cross-ethnic votes.
While I have already controlled for revenues from the central government in all re-
gressions using the government grant variable, it is also possible that the Center has
assisted the municipality in providing one of its services (i.e. paving or maintaining a
road) so that additional funds remain for buying equipment or training employees to
collect fees. In this scenario, the government grant variable by itself cannot capture
the additional assistance provided by the Center.
I therefore, re-estimate the regression and include a ministry assistance variable in
model 2. This variable was created by documenting every incidence of assistance from
the Ministry of Municipal Affairs between 2002 and 2007 such as constructing a public
8Personal nterview, March 2010
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marketplace for which the municipality can charge rental fees, paving roads within
the municipality, or additional training for municipal employees. It also includes the
participation of the municipality in an international donor program to improve local
governance and participation. Table 3 displays regression results when this variable is
included. Even with the inclusion of ministry assistance, tribal mobilization, tribal
fragmentation, and the interaction variable do not change much in terms of the
substantive value of coefficients or statistical significance.
Could it also be that modernity or historical legacy, rather than tribal fragmen-
tation, is the real motivator of better public goods provision? For instance, it is said
that Bedouin tribes are less fragmented than non-Bedouin tribes as the former used
to travel out to isolated parts of the desert and therefore, group solidarity was par-
ticularly important for security, the sharing of food and resources, and for providing
mutual company for one another (Lewis, 1987). Because Bedouin tribes also became
sedentary much later than non-Bedouin tribes, this means that they have had less
time to develop the skills needed for public goods provision (Jureidini & McLaurin,
1984). As AUTHOR reminds us in this special issue, historical legacies of public
goods provision (and lack thereof) continue to have contemporary impact.
Urban areas may also experience greater tribal fragmentation because residents
there may be more highly educated than in rural areas and education may have led
to more widespread rejection of tribal solidarity in favor of independent judgment9
(Department of Statistics in Jordan & ORC Macro, 2003). The distribution of
tribal members throughout various neighborhoods in urban areas may also hamper
9Personal interviews, December 15, 2008 and July 7, 2009)
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mobilization of members during elections and sanctioning them for noncompliant
behavior.
To test this possibility, in model 3 I include two additional variables in the re-
gression estimation as indicators of modernity: the population density level (density)
and whether the municipality contains a majority of residents of Bedouin descent
(Bedouin). Density is measured by the following formula: Pi/Ai, where P is the pop-
ulation of municipality i and A is its area. Municipalities where at least 60 percent of
the votes were won by Bedouin candidates were considered to have residential popu-
lations that were mostly Bedouin in origin. Candidates were designated as Bedouin
if they were from a tribe listed as Bedouin according to Jordanian electoral law.
The inclusion of the Bedouin and density variables do not change findings. While
Bedouin does have a negative impact on both types of service provision, its presence
in the estimation does not alter the relationship between tribal mobilization, frag-
mentation, and municipal service provision. In further robustness checks available
upon request, I also use different cutoff points for designation as to whether the
municipality had a majority of residents of Bedouin origin: (1) where at least 50 per-
cent of the vote was won by Bedouin candidates (2) where at least 70 percent of the
vote was won by these candidates and (3) the percentage of votes won by Bedouin
candidates. As in previous estimations, the coefficients for tribal mobilization and
fragmentation remain statistically significant.
In addition to the robustness checks discussed here, I also performed two addi-
tional checks available upon request: (1) using tobit instead of SUR to estimate the
regressions (2) and using self-collected revenues as the dependent variable instead of
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the log of self-collected revenues. Tobit is recommended when the dependent vari-
able is either bounded at a lower or upper limit. Here the quantity of equipment is
unlikely to exceed a certain value. The results do not change even after performing
these tests.
6 Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions to the study of diversity and public goods
provision. First of all, it suggests that a negative relationship between heterogeneity
and services is not as straightforward as some scholars suggest. Contrary to the con-
clusion of some who have proclaimed that there is now academic consensus regarding
the negative relationship between diversity and public goods provision, this study
demonstrates that we need to reconsider this proposition and in particular how we
measure diversity. We should distinguish between group structure and practice and
not use the former to make conclusions regarding the latter. Secondly, this study in-
dicates that identity group mobilization can reduce group voting and motivate good
governance in semidemocratic or authoritarian contexts where regime leaders have
purposely weakened political parties. When other democratic mechanisms are ab-
sent, identity group diversity and intra-group fragmentation can provide “natural”
motivators of good governance. The results of this paper also suggest that elections
even in electoral authoritarian or hybrid regimes can have a positive influence and
are not meaningless activities (Levitsky & Way, 2002, Schedler 2006).
Thirdly, this paper emphasizes that the relationship between diversity and pub-
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lic goods provision depends on an additional factor – the degree of fragmentation
within the groups themselves. Scholars have previously argued that diversity impairs
public goods provision because members of different identity groups possess diverg-
ing preferences, that group members can be punished by their leaders for failing to
cooperate with other groups, and that members prefer to work with each other be-
cause of shared culture and preferences (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina, Baqir,
& Easterly, 1999). However, if the group itself is politically or socially fragmented,
then even homogeneous populations encounter these obstacles. We should not as-
sume that members of the same identity group share similar preferences, are capable
of punishing each other for renegade behavior, or desire even to collaborate with one
another. Whereas previous studies have used these mechanisms to explain why het-
erogeneous settings underproduce public goods, this study highlights that members
within groups can be as varied as those between groups.
But perhaps what this study demonstrates is simply that locations where only
one group is politically mobilized are not really homogeneous and that varying levels
of tribal aggregation can be salient? In some respects this is true: certainly, across
different types of Jordanian elections, the number of candidates that tribes offer
varies according to what unit is politically salient. In parliamentary elections where
the electoral district might comprise of several municipalities, large tribes tend to
offer only one candidate per tribe but in municipal competitions, the number of
challengers per tribe greatly increases. But at the heart of the matter is not that
tribes are capable of behaving strategically but whether they do or do not. What
this study showcases is that even in areas where only one tribe is mobilized, some
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tribes coordinate competition between their candidates while others do not. Even
within municipalities where only one tribe is mobilized, tribal fragmentation varies.
This study also emphasizes a new mechanism – electoral competition – and how
the desire to win votes outside of one’s own group discourages clientelism and en-
courages inclusiveness. When the median voter is no longer an individual within
one’s own group but one outside it, candidates are forced to accommodate the needs
of non-members in order to win elections. This finding regarding competition also
has implications for the design of electoral systems and the debate regarding whether
proportional representation or majoritarian systems are superior for divided societies
(Horowitz, 1991, Lijphart, 1977). Like Reilly (2001) and Selway and Templeman
(2012), the results of this study suggest that majoritarian systems are favorable be-
cause they encourage candidates to reach out to non-group members and to craft
policies that are moderate and inclusive.
This study has focused on the subnational level and we should also consider
whether findings here are generalizable to the national level. On the one hand,
because national electoral districts are larger than subnational ones, we would expect
greater cross-group voting, which suggests that good service provision will result.
However, this is dependent upon whether the population within national electoral
districts is segregated or not. If it is segregated then members of parliament may
represent the wishes of constituents within their specific identity groups and have few
incentives to provide public goods rather than private goods. Furthermore, Gerring
et al (2014) notes that coordination and sanctioning dynamics may be more difficult
at the national level where the number of groups is greater. At the local level, he
34
notes that informal mechanisms for political participation are likely to be in place
but that similar mechanisms may be absent at the national level. If this is true then
the elected official may be an individual that residents, especially those outside of
the group of the official, have never met and whom they cannot sanction for poor
behavior.
I hope that the results from this study will encourage scholars to seek a better
understanding of the ability of heterogeneity to encourage cross-group voting and
the significance of internal fragmentation and their collective impact on government
services. While many previous studies have highlighted the negative relationship
between diversity and public goods provision, this work and others like it may serve
as a reminder that there is not yet consensus regarding the direction and nature of
this relationship.
35
References
Addison, T. & Rahman, A. (2001). Why is so little spent on educating the poor?
Discussion paper No. 2001/29, United Nations University, WIDER.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R. & Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114 (4): 1243-1283.
Alesina, A., Devleesshauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003).
Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8: 155-194.
Alon, Y. (2002). The making of Jordan: Tribes, colonialism, and the modern state..
London, UK: I. B. Tauris.
Auyero, J. (2000). The logic of clientelism in Argentina: An ethnographic account.
American Political Science Review, 104 (4): 644-662.
Baldwin, K. & Huber, J. (2010). Economic versus cultural differences: Forms of
ethnic diversity and public goods provision. Latin American Research Review, 35
(3): 55-81.
Banerjee, A., Iyer, L., & Somanathan, R. (2005). History, social divisions, and
public goods in rural India. Journal of the European Economic Association, 32
(2-3): 639-647.
Banerjee, A. & Somanathan, R. (2007). The political economy of public goods: Some
evidence from India. Journal of Development Economics, 82: 287-314.
Bardhan, P. (2007). Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation
communities in south India. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 48(4):
847-865.
Beal, D. J., Cohen, R. R., Burke, M. J., & McLendon, C. L. (2003). Cohesion
and performance in groups: A meta-analytic clarification of construct relations.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(6): 989-1004.
Besley, T., Coate, S. and Loury, G. (1993). The economics of rotating savings and
credit associations. The American Economic Review, 83(4): 792-810.
Birney, M. (2007). The impact of local elections on the prospects for political re-
form in authoritarian countries: Theoretical perspectives from China. Unpublished
manuscript, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
36
Birnir, J. K. (2009). Ethnicity and electoral politics. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Blaydes, L. (2011). Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Boustan, L. P., Fernando F., Winkler, H. & Zolt, E. (2010). Income inequality and
local government in the United States, 1970-2000. NBER Working Paper Series,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. (2004). “Vote-buying in Argentina.” Latin
American Research Review, 39(2): 66-88.
Carey, J. M. & Shugart, M. S. (1995). Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A
rank ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies, 14(4): 417-439.
Carron, A. V., Brawley, L. R. & Widmeyer, W. N. (1998). Measurement of cohesion in
sport and exercise. In J. L. Duda (Ed.), Advances in Sport and Exercise Psychology
Measurement (pp. 213-226). Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology,
213-226.
Cederman, L. & Girardin, L. (2007). Beyond fractionalization: Mapping ethnicity
onto nationalist insurgencies. American Political Science Review, 101(1): 173-185.
Chandra, K. (2004). Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic headcounts
in India. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Chandra, K. (2007). Counting heads. In H. Kitschelt and S. Wilkinson (Eds.), Pa-
tronage and Clientelism (pp. 84-109). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Chandra, K. (2011). What is an ethnic identity? Party Politics, 17(2): 151-169.
Chandra, K. & Wilkinson, S. (2008). Measuring the effect of ‘ethnicity’. Comparative
Political Studies, 41(4/5): 515-563.
Clark, J. (2012). Municipalities go to market: Economic reform and political con-
testation in Jordan. Mediterranean Politics, 17(3), 358-375.
Cox, G. W. (1996). Is the single nontransferable vote superproportional? Evidence
from Japan and Taiwan. American Journal of Political Science, 40(3), 740-755.
Department of Statistics (Jordan) & ORC Macro. (2003). Jordan population and
family health survey 2002: Key findings. Calverton, Maryland, USA: ORC Macro
37
Dunning, T. & Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An ex-
perimental study of cousinage in Mali. American Political Science Review, 104(1):
21-39.
Easterly, W. & Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic
divisions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4): 1203-1250.
Egel, D. (2012). Tribal heterogeneity and the allocation of publicly provided goods:
Evidence from Yemen. Journal of Development Economics, 101: 228-232.
Gerring, J., Thacker, S. C., Lu, Y. & Huang, W. (2015). Does diversity impair
human development? A multilevel test of the diversity debit hypothesis. World
Development, 66: 166-188.
Gibson, C. C. & Hoffman, B. D. (2013). Coalitions not conflicts: Ethnicity, political
institutions, and expenditure in Africa. Comparative Politics: 1605-1627.
Gisselquist, R. M. (2013). Ethnic divisions and public goods provision, revisited.
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37(9) 273-290.
Glennerster, R., Miguel, E. & Rothenburg, A. D. (2013). Collective action in diverse
Sierra Leone communities. Economic Journal, 123: 285-316.
Gubler, J. R. & Selway, J. S. (2012). Horizontal inequality, crosscutting cleavages,
and civil war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(2) 206-232.
Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N. & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why
does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? American Political Sci-
ence Review, 101(4): 709-725.
Hecock, D. R. (2006). Electoral competition, globalization, and subnational educa-
tion spending in Mexico, 1999-2004. American Journal of Political Science, 50(4),
950-961.
Hiskey, J. T. (2003). Demand-based development and local electoral environments
in Mexico. Comparative Politics, 36(1), 41-59.
Hopkins, D. J. (2011). The limited local impacts of ethnic and racial diversity.
American Politics Research, 39(2): 344-379.
Horowitz, D. L. (1991). A democratic South Africa? Constitutional engineering in a
divided society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
38
Jones, M. P. (1997). Racial heterogeneity and the effective number of candidates
in majority runoff elections: Evidence from Louisiana. Electoral Studies, 16(3),
349-358.
Jordan Center for Social Research. (2007). The 2007 municipal elections in Jordan:
An exit poll conducted in six electoral districts located in six municipalities. 23
August 2007. Amman, Jordan: Jordan Center for Social Research.
Jureidini, P. A., & McLaurin, R. D. (1984). Jordan: The impact of social change
and the role of tribes. New York, NY: Praeger Publishers.
Kotler-Berkowitz, L. A. (2001). Ethnicity and politics: Cohesion, division and British
Jews. Political Studies, 49(4): 648-669.
Kimenyi, M. (2006). Ethnicity, governance and the provision of public goods. Journal
of African Economies, 15 (supplement 1): 62-99.
LaPorta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A, & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of
government. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1): 222-279.
Langston, E. M. (2005). The Islamist movement and tribal networks: Islamist party
mobilization amongst the tribes of Jordan and Yemen. PhD Dissertation. Univer-
sity of Kentucky, Lexington.
Layne, L. (1994). Home and homeland: The dialogics of tribal and national identities
in Jordan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lewis, N. N. (1997). Nomads and settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800-1980. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levitsky, S. & Way, L. A. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal
of Democracy, 13(2):51-65.
Lieberman, E. & Singh, P. (2012). Conceptualizing and measuring ethnic politics: An
institutional complement to demographic, behavioral, and cognitive approaches.
Studies in Comparative International Development, 47:255-286.
Lijphart, A. (1977). Democracy in plural societies: A Comparative Exploration. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lupu, Noam and Jonas Pontusson 2011. “The structure of inequality and the politics
of redistribution.” American Political Science Review, 105(2): 316-336.
39
Manion, M. (1996). The electoral connection in the Chinese countryside. American
Political Science Review, 90(4), 736-748.
Matuszeski, J. & Schneider, F. (2006). Patterns of ethnic group segregation and civil
conflict. Unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya
versus Tanzania. World Politics, 56: 327-62.
Miguel, E. & Gugerty, M. K. (2005). Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public
goods in Kenya. Journal of Public Economics, 89: 2325-2368.
Minority Rights Group International. (n.d.) World directory of minorities: Jordan.
Available at:http://www.minorityrights.org/4940/jordan/jordan-overview.html
Montalvo, J. G. & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic devel-
opment. Journal of Development Economics, 76: 293-323.
National Democratic Institute. (1995). Democracy and local government elections in
Jordan: 1995 Municipal elections. Available from http://www.ndi.org/node/13892
Neto, O. A. & Gary Cox. (1997). Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the
number of parties. American Journal of Political Science, 41(1), 149-174.
Ordeshook, P. C. and Shvetsova, O. V. (1994). Ethnic heterogeneity, district mag-
nitude, and the number of parties. American Journal of Political Science, 38(1),
100-123.
Østby, G. (2008). Polarization, horizontal inequalities, and violent civil conflict.
Journal of Peace Research, 45(2): 143-162.
Polat, O¨. (2012). How do ethnic fragmentation and ethnic civil society organizations
relate to public good provision? Evidence From Jordan. Unpublished manuscript,
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
Posner, D. N. (2004). Measuring ethnic fractionalization in Africa. American Journal
of Political Science, 48(4): 849-863.
Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Powell, B. G. (1982). Contemporary democracies: Participation, stability, and vio-
lence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
40
Putnam, R. D. (2007). E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-
first century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture. Scandinavian Political Studies,
30(2):137-174.
Reilly, B. (2002). Electoral systems for divided societies. Journal of Democracy,
13(2): 156-170,
Robins, P. (2004). A History of Jordan. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Rugh, J. S. & Trounstine, J. (2013). The provision of local public goods in diver-
seccommunities: Analyzing municipal bond elections. Journal of Politics, 73(4):
1038-1050.
Scarritt, J. & Mozaffar, S. (1999). The specification of ethnic cleavages and ethnop-
olitical groups for the analysis of democratic competition in contemporary Africa.
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 5(1): 82-117.
Schedler, A. (Ed.) (2006). Electoral authoritarianism: The dynamics of unfree com-
petition. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Selway, J. S.. (2011a). Cross-cuttingness, cleavage structures and civil war onset.
British Journal of Political Science, 41(1): 111-131.
Selway, J. S. (2011b). The measurement of cross-cutting cleavages and other multi-
dimensional cleavage structures. Political Analysis, 19: 48-65.
Selway, J. S. (2015). Coalitions of the wellbeing: How electoral rules and ethnic
politics shape health policy in developing countries. New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Selway, J. S. & Templeman, K. (2012). The myth of consociationalism? Conflict
reduction in divided societies. Comparative Political Studies, 45(12):1542-1571.
Shehata, S. (2008). Inside Egyptian parliamentary campaigns. In E. Lust-Okar & S.
Zerhouni (Eds.), Political participation in the Middle East (pp. 95-120). Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Singh, P. (2010). We-ness and welfare: A longitudinal analysis of social development
in Kerala, India. World Development, 39(2): 282-293.
Stewart, F. (2002). Horizontal inequalities: A neglected dimension of development.
CRISE Working Paper, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Oxford,
UK.
41
Stokes, S. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with
evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, 99(3): 315-325.
Stoll, H. (2013). Changing societies, changing party systems. New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Taagepera, R. (1999). The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and
electoral system. Comparative Political Studies, 32(5), 531-54.
Tetreault, M. A. (2000). Stories of democracy: Politics and society in contemporary
Kuwait. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Tsai, L. L. (2007). Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods
provision in rural China. American Political Science Review, 101(2), 355-372.
Valeri, M. (2009). Oman: Politics and society in the Qaboos state. London, UK: C.
Hurst
Vigdor, J. (2004). Community composition and collective action: Analyzing initial
mail response to the 2000 census. Review of Economics and Statistics, 86(1): 303-
312.
Waring, T. M. & Bell, A. V. (2013). Ethnic dominance damages cooperation more
than ethnic diversity: Results from multiethnic field experiments in India. Evolu-
tion and Human Behavior, 34(6): 398-404.
Waring, T. M. (2011). Ethnic forces in collective action: Diversity, dominance, and
irrigation in Tamil Nadu. Ecology and Society, 16(4): 1-19.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2008). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Mason,
OH: South Western College.
42
Low Mobilization High Mobilization
High Fragmentation Good Good
Low Fragmentation Poor Good
Figure 1: Tribal Mobilization, Fragmentation, and Public Goods Provision.
This figure diplays the predicted quality of public goods provision according to levels
of tribal mobilization and fragmentation as outlined in the hypotheses in Section 2.
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Revenues 93 -1.38 0.64 -3.70 -0.21
Equipment 93 23.88 36.62 5 275
Tribal Mobilization 93 8.17 8.47 1 51
Fragmentation 93 1.74 0.89 1 8.5
Population 93 31,471 63,315 1,427 414,760
Area 93 10,494 10,912 768 68,076
Poverty Rate 93 18.45 14.54 1.7 73.6
Government Grant 93 13.29 0.71 11.66 15.49
District Magnitude 93 8.97 3.20 6 29
Electoral District 93 3.80 2.94 1 23
Palestinian Population 93 0.22 0.41 0 1
Category 1 93 0.12 0.32 0 1
Category 2 93 0.52 0.50 0 1
Category 3 93 0.27 0.45 0 1
Table 1: Summary Statistics. This table contains the summary statistics of the
independent, dependent, and control variables used in regression estimations in this
article. Data sources: Jordan’s Ministry of Municipal Affairs, the Local Governance
Development Program, and assorted tribal dictionaries.
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N=90 N=3 t-value p-value
Tribal Mobilization 7 43 42.3 0.05%
% of Revenues Self-Collected 29% 56% 8.9 1.2%
No. of Municipal Equipment 18 189 4.8 4.0%
Table 2: Means of Independent and Dependent Variables for Outlier and
Non-Outlier Observations. This table displays the mean levels of tribal mobiliza-
tion, percentage of revenues that are self-collected, and the quantity of equipment
for the three observations that are outliers as well as for the 90 observations that are
not. The t-values and p-values are calculated for the difference in means between
the 90 observations and the three outliers.
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Figure 2: The Marginal Effect of Tribal Mobilization on the Percentage
of Revenues that are Self-Collected as Tribal Fragmentation Changes.
Calculations based on Model 1 in Table 3.
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Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Tribal Mobilization on the Quantity of
Equipment as Tribal Fragmentation Changes. Calculations based on Model 1
in Table 3.
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Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of Tribal Fragmentation on the Percent-
age of Revenues that are Self-Collected as Tribal Mobilization Changes.
Calculations based on Model 1 in Table 3.
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Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of Tribal Fragmentation on the Quantity of
Equipment as Tribal Mobilization Changes. Calculations based on Model 1 in
Table 3.
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